Showing posts with label September. Show all posts
Showing posts with label September. Show all posts

Wednesday, 23 September 2015

Complex odours and simple smells

I have just finished reading the introduction to a thesis. It was well-written and well-argued, a pleasure to read. Yet, what struck me was the fact that almost all of the literature referenced was published within the past 20 years. Now, for a student, 20 years ago may seem like ancient history, and of course there’s little point in going back too far if your field is molecular genetics. But the literature relevant to food or taste or odour preferences and perceptions is not like that: there’s a lot of psychology from mid-20th century (and sometimes earlier) onwards that is highly relevant.

In 1968, Zajonc published the initial paper on the phenomenon of mere exposure (ME) [1], the idea that liking for something increases as we are repeatedly exposed to it. Notice that I didn’t say “as we become more familiar with it”, and this is because Zajonc found that, strangely, familiarity did not increase for his rapidly-presented visual stimuli even though liking did. This is just one of the many interesting aspects of this phenomenon. Indeed, his research participants weren’t even aware of the nature of the stimulus to which they were exposed since the exposure time was typically about 0.004 seconds.

Fast-forward forty years, and my colleagues and I studied ME for odours, which turned out to be different form the ME seen with simple visual stimuli [2]. We were interested in effects of attention on development of odour liking following studies that showed if you ignored a novel visual stimulus, it became less liked. We were familiar too with research showing that emotions direct attention – you’ll pay increased attention to something that is either appealing or threatening, for example. In fact, we managed to replicate the findings of the studies using visual stimuli, showing that you can be repeatedly exposed to an odour without getting to like it if your attention is directed elsewhere. It is as if, by allocating attention away from a stimulus, you are also sending a message to the emotion processing bits of your brain about its lack of emotional relevance.

Now, a recent paper by Delplanque and colleagues has shown that the ME effect with odours seems to depend on just how pleasant the odour is judged prior to exposure [3]. Importantly, the effect is not linear – that is, if an odour is either very pleasant or very unpleasant to begin with, you get little impact of being repeatedly exposed to it. This is not difficult to explain with very pleasant odours as they may be reaching a sort of hedonic asymptote. Also, since these are odours with which we are likely to be familiar, they may be more easily identified – in essence, we’ve already made up our mind about how pleasant they are.

Initially very unpleasant odours remain unpleasant despite exposure quite probably because their “hedonic tone” is a signal of potential danger – a signal that would be diluted if ME could change liking for them. As an example, odours of rotting, faecal odours, or highly pungent odours may provide us with good adaptive information because of their ability to repel us.

So, odours can be seen to be quite different to meaningless visual stimuli, of the type used in Zajonc’s studies, because unless they are highly novel, there is already some degree of pleasantness built in. Moreover, complete odour novelty is hard to find since the notes in complex odours may be reminiscent of other, better known smells. It is telling, for example, that the odour that showed the greatest change in the Delplanque study was the allegedly “no odour” control.

Familiarity is well known to be associated with increasing pleasantness in odours, but only if we exclude those odour that are highly unpleasant, for which the association breaks down. If for a moment, we do exclude these, does that mean that we like odours because they are more familiar? Is this what ME is achieving for odours?

These questions bring me to the older paper that I really wanted to discuss, namely Berlyne’s studies of novelty, liking and stimulus complexity [4]. Like Zajonc, Berlyne used repeatedly presented visual stimuli and he initially found that lower familiarity was associated with high pleasantness. He realized, though, that he was failing to consider the complexity of that stimulus. To take account of this, he proposed that increased complexity – and/or increased novelty – produces high arousal, which is unpleasant. So, if we reduce the complexity and/or novelty of a stimulus, it becomes paired with lower arousal, and hence produces increased feelings of pleasure/reward.

So how does this apply to odours? Surely, we get bored with simple food or other odours, while complex odours are interesting? Well, maybe. But what constitutes complexity as far as odours are concerned? Let’s take the example of wines, mainly because we are used to talking about them in complex terms. It is evident that highly complex wines – those with many different facets or odour notes – are valued highly. You don’t get 95 on the “100 point” scale (see: Overrated wines) by having a simple flavour. But ….. such points aren’t awarded for liking; they are awarded for appreciation, which is not the same thing at all. You and I can like a complex Burgundy an awful lot, even if the only term that we can apply to it is “wine flavour”.

In fact, and perhaps surprisingly, as we become more familiar with odours, we not only like them more, we also judge them as less complex [5]. But interestingly, familiarity is not associated with the number of notes that an odour might have – something that we might ordinarily think of (as in the case of wine, above) as a proxy for complexity.

So, attention, arousal, novelty, liking and complexity are all linked somehow, and if your brain is hurting, I can’t blame you – it’s all too complex! Try this. Zajonc proposed that exposed stimuli become like because of increased ease with which the brain can process them. Complexity may be synonymous with novelty simply because the brain takes longer or expends more effort in this processing. In terms of perception and behavior, something that is novel or surprising is, by definition, a violation of expectations that will involve increased (unpleasant) arousal and a direction of attention to stimulus features to assess if some action needs to be taken – perhaps there is danger, for example.

Consider this sequence next time you encounter something wrong or unexpected with, say, a drink. Arousal increases as you pay close attention to your drink: you sniff, repeatedly, attempting to identify the problem …. this process is, in a way, making features stand out and the drink odour seems more complex. You sniff again – hmmm, cat’s pee. That’s ok, then. You asked for a Riesling, but you were given a Sauvignon blanc. Arousal decreases, as familiarity and liking both increase, and you can pay attention to something else, like your meal.

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1. Zajonc, R.B., Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 1968. 9(2): 1-27.
2. Prescott, J., H. Kim, and K.-O. Kim, Cognitive mediation of hedonic changes to odors following exposure. Chemosens. Percept., 2008. 1: 2-8.
3. Delplanque, S., G. Coppin, L. Bloesch, I. Cayeux, and D. Sander, The mere exposure effect depends on an odor's initial pleasantness. Frontiers in psychology, 2015. 6: 911.
4. Berlyne, D.E., Novelty, complexity, and hedonic value. Percept. Psychophys., 1970. 8: 279-286.
5. Sulmont, C., S. Issanchou, and E.P. Koster, Selection of odorants for memory tests on the basis of familiarity, perceived complexity, pleasantness, similarity and identification. Chemical Senses, 2002. 27: 307-317.

Tuesday, 23 September 2014

Leaving a bad taste

Some emotion researchers suggest there are only a very small number of universal emotions: fear, anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, and disgust (see October, 2013: http://prescotttastematters.blogspot.com.au/2013/10/feeling-all-emotional.html). All other emotion terms, in this view, reflect these basic emotions. But even if you are inclined to believe that there are dozens, if not hundreds, of distinct emotional states, there remains one common indivisible emotion, disgust. Disgust sits alone in the cathedral of emotions, shunned even by dislike, guilty and worried. When talking about emotions elicited by foods, the uniqueness of disgust is rather …. unique, in that it is the only emotion that specifically implies a relationship to our sense of taste.

But, of course, foods are not supposed to disgust us, and fortunately most of us seldom come across examples of foods that do. Moreover, although our potential experience and expression disgust is innate, we need to learn what things should make us disgusted. It is a familiar enough scenario where a mother mimics the classic disgust face to a child about to eat something they have picked up from a footpath. With just a wrinkle of the nose, a baring of the upper teeth and a gaping mouth (and perhaps a “Yuk!”), the mother teaches the child a lesson about the potential dangers of otherwise edible items contaminated by …. who knows what, but certainly something that might cause disease. This common sense view is generally supported too by theoretical accounts of the evolutionary purpose of such a strong emotion which stress its role as disease-prevention mechanism [1].

Indeed, we could argue that disgust – despite the origins of the word – has little to do with taste or foods per se. Paul Rozin has characterized disgust as the emotional aspect of fear of contamination through, in the case of foods, consumption. Hence, food is just one of those things that we stick in out mouths that could potentially cause us harm via contamination. It is easy to show that food likes and dislikes show an inconsistent relationship to disgust. So, foods that are highly unpleasant, for example by being bitter, do not necessarily, or even often, induce feelings of disgust.  And, of course, it is possible for us to recognize that foods from other cultures could potentially taste great and be full of important nutrients, even if the idea of them caused a distinct shuddering of the spine.

We can see an illustration of this in the recent enthusiasm for insects as potential food sources in the future. A small, but growing, movement is examining how best to take advantage of the nutrients that insects can provide, and considering how best to deal with consumer responses to this [2]. Because of this interest, which is strong in Denmark, I was recently treated to a lunch provided by the Nordic Food Lab (www.nordicfoodlab.org), in which the menu contained a dish labeled “Peas and Bees”. The label was perfectly descriptive, and I managed to overcome my urge to say “thank you, I’m already full”. Those expecting little yellow and black highlights against the green background would have been disappointed, however, as only bee larvae were used.

Disgust doesn’t always require extreme foods or obvious contamination. Perfectly clean, everyday foods in perfectly clean bedpans will do it, as will being offered a glass of water into which a plastic model of a cockroach has been briefly dipped. In an earlier posting, I noted the extreme reactions to a choc-mint flavoured potato crisp (November, 2013: http://prescotttastematters.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/colour-me-minty.html). In many respects, this response to violation of expectations is a co-opting of so-called core disgust (that is, associated with ingestion of a potential contaminant) to cover a situation in which the unpredictability of the flavour could be a signal for possible danger.

A broadening of the disgust emotion to include those situations where contamination in the physical sense is not a risk is also evident. We talk, for example, about being disgusted by violence or by someone’s behavior or their appearance or their table manners. At least some of these reactions can be included under the term moral disgust. Rozin [3] suggests that the disgust emotion began life as an extension of our in-built responses to bitterness to which we added a cognitive appraisal of other (whether bitter or not) substances that we did not want to consume. This allows us to learn what to be disgusted by as a function of culture or violated expectations. Similarly, strong violations of beliefs, values or rules have become ‘attached’ to disgust. While we might just be using disgust as a metaphor in such situations, there is evidence that it is something more fundamental. Thus, in the same way that the classic disgust facial expression shares common features with facial expressions to unpalatably bitter foods, it can be shown that both core disgust and the moral disgust at being treated unfairly in a game activate a very similar set of facial muscles [4]. So, at least the expression of disgust appears to be highly similar.

A later study looked at associations between bitterness sensitivity, reflected in PROP taster status (May, 2013: http://prescotttastematters.blogspot.com.au/2013_05_01_archive.html), and different questionnaire scales of disgust sensitivity [5]. By distinguishing between different types of disgust: visceral (related to disease, bodily fluids and sexual activity) and moral, the study was able to show that those most sensitive to the bitterness of PROP (supertasters) were also significantly more sensitive to visceral disgust - that is, involving the possibility of contamination through ingestion or otherwise - but not moral disgust. It is possible therefore that the link between core disgust and moral disgust is merely semantic or metaphorical. An alternative explanation, however, is that (as suggested above) that across the two stages or jumps from bitterness responses to core disgust to moral disgust, the link between taste reactivity and moral disgust is weakened or lost.

In either case, examining the origins of moral disgust provides further opportunities to consider the possibility – raised in the previous two postings – that the source of many of our more complex emotional or personality traits can be found in quite fundamental early taste experiences.
                                                                                                                       

1.          Oaten, M.J., R.J. Stevenson, and T.I. Case, Disgust as a Disease-Avoidance Mechanism. PSYCHOL. BULL., 2009. 135(2): p. 303-321.
2.          Verbeke, W., Profiling consumers who are ready to adopt insects as a meat substitute in a Western society. Food Qual Pref, 2015. 39: p. 147-155.
3.          Rozin, P., From Oral to Moral. Science, 2009. 323: p. 1179-1180.
4.          Chapman, H.A., et al., In Bad Taste: Evidence for the Oral Origins of Moral Disgust. Science, 2009. 323: p. 1222-1226.
5.          Herz, R.S., PROP Taste Sensitivity is Related to Visceral but Not Moral Disgust. Chem. Percept., 2011. 4: p. 72-79.

Thursday, 27 September 2012

The highly discriminating consumer



In the sensory evaluation of foods or drinks, good practice dictates that the type of question being asked will determine both the method of evaluation and the sort of panelist that is required. To analyze the different odours, tastes and textures within a complex food requires considerable training in vocabulary and use of rating scales. One by-product of such analytical training is that the individuals become very sensitive to variations in the intensity of product attributes and, by extension, to differences between samples on these attributes. In effect, trained panelists are good at seeing the signal amid the noise of lots of other product qualities.


In contrast, untrained consumers are highly variable in their use of sensory terms and their assessment of attribute intensities. It is not that you can’t ask consumers about product attributes, but rather that you’ll end up with a highly variable set of numbers if you do. An implicit assumption has been that because of such variability, consumers are unlikely to be sensitive to variations between similar products or versions of products, if those differences are quite subtle.


But what if discrimination isn’t only about perceptual sensitivity? Students of Signal Detection Theory (and who isn’t?) will know that decisions are based not only on perceptual sensitivity but also on one’s criterion – essentially, one’s willingness to report something as being present or not. This is often referred to as response bias, and signal detection and discrimination methods measure it independently of sensitivity.

We might want to consider also the reasons why we might want to discriminate between different products or samples. A few years ago, my flavourist colleague Leslie Norris and I were sitting in her kitchen discussing whether or not any improvement could be made in the way that wineries tested for the presence of cork taint in batches of wine. At that time, in order to reduce the amount of tainted wine that reached the consumer, highly trained panels were used because these individuals could be made very sensitive to the tainting compound TCA (trichloranisole) through their training. But then we had a shared “aha” moment. Trained panels were being used to ask a question that was primarily of relevance to consumers. What if these panels were too sensitive, potentially rejecting batches of wine that consumers would find perfectly acceptable? The outcome of this was a method – which we termed the consumer rejection threshold – that specifically used consumer preference responses [1]. In this case, consumers were, by definition, sensitive enough, but not too sensitive, to achieve the aim.


More fundamentally, perhaps, recent research has suggested that consumers might in fact be highly discriminating, at least partly as a function of not being trained. Analytical panelists become skilled at ignoring their emotional responses to the samples that they evaluate, with the (probably correct) assumption that analytical and hedonic approaches are necessarily antagonistic. If discrimination were purely a perceptual process then we might argue that removing emotion from the equation is appropriate.

In fact, a case can be made that ignoring emotional responses actually impairs discriminative ability. Several studies over the past decade suggest that engaging and utilizing emotions may be critical to discrimination. An evaluation procedure known as the authenticity test has sometimes been shown to be superior to analytical methods at detecting product differences. The essence of this test is that the emotions of regular consumers of a product are manipulated by exposing them to a story that has a strong negative implication for their product. For example, in one study, regular consumers of Danish milk were told that foreign milk imports might be introduced onto the market [2]. Instead of being asked to find the different sample or the sample with the highest level of some property, the consumers are asked to pick the authentic (that is, Danish) sample. In this case, the milk samples differed according to feed type and storage time, and the authenticity test revealed that both factors had an impact on milk flavour.


Why do emotions improve discriminability? One persuasive argument is that eliciting emotional states allows access to the otherwise “unconscious”, implicitly learned information about the product that all regular consumers possess. In other words, we are all experts in respect to the flavour and other sensory characteristics of our favourite products, even if we do not possess explicit awareness of such knowledge or a detailed sensory lexicon [3]. This explanation (also called the mood as Information hypothesis by social psychologists) proposes that negative emotions focus attention on deviations from the implicit memory of product attributes. Negative emotions are necessary because they probably act as signals that something is wrong. In effect, we monitor our own mood to infer that there is a problem. In turn, this evokes cognitive effort to search for causes of the “problem”. It becomes adaptive, therefore, to pay attention to details. In terms of the authenticity test, it is the unauthentic product that raises the alarm.


The ability of the authenticity test to induce emotional arousal and improve discrimination is also consistent with what we know from psychology and neuroscience about emotion and attention. It is clear that the brain allocates attention to stimuli as a function of their emotional significance. Thus, using emotional priming stimuli (a smiley face will do) in a detection task produces improved detection of very brief neutral stimuli that follow it. Similarly, emotional facial expressions command attention much more quickly than other sorts of stimuli, as do stimuli that have previously been paired with a reward.


Another way of considering the relationship between emotion and discrimination is to think about the later as a choice situation. Choices and preferences are intimately linked (see for example, Taste Matters website or blog, August, 2012: Choosing to like of liking to choose). Making a discrimination is of course making a choice on some basis. Why pick one thing over another? If an emotion is crucial to the decision, then the decision has motivational implications. In some cases, discrimination between alternatives allows selection that contributes to survival, such as when we choose a high-energy food over a low energy version.

Invoking a motivational explanation of discrimination leads to some interesting predictions. It suggests, for example, that we might be better at discriminating tastes or flavours when we are hungry …. but only for those substances that are likely to reduce hunger.  Cattle, sheep, horses and rabbits select and eat more of forage cut later in the day, when sugars are highest. We, too, should be better at discriminating sweet - but not bitter - tastes of different intensities before lunch.